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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF trrAB 
JERALD L. KILPACK, individually 
and as Guard1an ad litem for 
Jess Allred Kilpack, a minor, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
LaMARK WIGNALL and DAVID WIGNALL, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16175 
On June 21, 1976, Defendants LaMark Wignall and 
David Wignall took five small children, including Jess Allred 
Kilpack, then barely age 7, to a hayfield, where Defendants 
commenced gathering hay bales. Jess Allred Kilpack was permitted 
to climb out the cab of the truck down onto the running board 
and to ride there, watching two slightly older boys jump off and 
on the running board for 15 or 20 minutes. Jess Kilpack then 
attempted to jump off the running board onto a bale of hay, but 
slipped and was run over by the rear dual wheels of the truck, 
thereby suffering near fatal, extensive, permanent injuries. 
On November 15, 1976, the father of Jess Kilpack brought suit in 
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Utah County against Defendants, seeking recovery for his son's 
injuries and recovery of medical expenses. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 6, 1978, trial was commenced before a Utah 
County jury, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen presiding. Plain-
tiff's counsel attempted to voir dire the jury as to several 
matters, and after the testimony of the first witness was com-
pleted, Defendants' counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of 
part of the attempted voir dire, and the Court granted the motion. 
The case was tried before a second jury on October 2, 3 and 4, 
1978. At the close of the evidence, Plaintiff moved the Court 
for a directed verdict on the liability issues. The trial Court 
denied the motion and denied a motion made by Defendants for a 
directed verdict on the liability issues in Defendants' favor. 
The case was submitted to the jury at noon on October 4, 1978, 
and after returning from lunch, the jury announced it had reached 
a verdict. The jury answered the first interrogatory of the 
special verdict, which inquired as to whether the Defendants, or 
either of them, were negligent, "No", and did not answer the 
balance of the questions, except for a portion of a damage inter-
rogatory. The Court entered a judgment on the verdict "no cause 
of action" and later denied Plaintiff's Hotions for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the "no cause of action" 
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verdict and reversal of the lower court's denial of Plaifttlff'a 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and MotiOD !or 
a New Trial, and a new trial on the issue of damages on proper 
instructions, and a determination by this Court that the queatloaa 
asked, and the other questions sought to be asked of the flrat 
jury were proper inquiries, and should have been allowed ~ the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Resolution of the legal issues of Defendants' negligence 
and any negligence of the injured minor child requires a review 
of the evidence on those issues, for the purpose of determining 
whether reasonable persons could reach different conclusions. 
The following statement of facts will first 
recap the evidence on the negligence issues, witness by witness: 
Four witnesses testified concerning the facts and circum-
stances of the accident: Joel Kilpack, age 9 at the time, one 
of the other children that accompanied Defendants to the hayfield, 
Jess Kilpack, then age 7, the injured child, and each of the 
Defendants. 
The record on appeal contains two partial transcripts. 
The transcript which contains the testimony of the two children 
from the time they arrived at the hayfield with Defendants to the 
time of the accident, and the entire testimony of each of the 
Defendants,is contained in the 90-page partial transcript which 
has been marked by the Court Clerk Number 143. It is to this 
-3-
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transcript that the below references pertaining to the testimony 
of the two children and Defendants' testimony are made. 
Joel Kilpack testified that Defendants and the five 
children rode to the field in a red flatbed haytruck (owned by 
Defendant LaMark Wignall) and that when the truck arrived at the 
hayfield, the three youngest children, Jess Kilpack, age 7, 
Debbie Wilson, age 6, and Dennis Wilson, age 5, got in the cab 
of the truck with Defendant David Wignall, and that he (Joel 
Kilpack) and Danny Wilson, both age 9, jumped on the running 
board on the passenger side of the truck after it started, and 
were thereafter off and on the running board two or three times 
as the truck proceeded through the hayfield before the accident 
occurred. (Tr. 3-5, 22, 25) Joel testified that after he and 
Danny Wilson had mounted the running board of the moving truck 
they took turns holding on to the brace which held the outside 
mirror frame on the passenger side of the truck, and would jump 
back and forth between the running board and bales of hay as they 
passed a short distance from the running board. (Tr. 4-5) He 
stated that the hay bales were about two feet out from the running 
board and that the tops of the bales were about six inches lower 
than the running board. (Tr. 13-14) After playing on the running 
board for a while in the manner mentioned, and then jumping off 
and running to arrange hay bales, Joel Kilpack and Danny Wilson 
returned and jumped on the running board, but found that the 
running board was then crowded because Jess Kilpack and Dennis 
-4-
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Wilson were then riding on the running board, so Joel and 
Danny Wilson actually boosted Dennis Wilson, age 5, back through 
the passenger window into the cab. (Tr. 5-61 Ex. 4 and 5) 
Joel further testified that Danny Wilson slipped off the runniDg 
board as the truck was moving along and that Jess had to help 
him clamber back on the running board because he was dragging 
along as the truck moved. (Tr. S-6, 101 Ex. 6) Joel Kilpack 
further testified that he heard no instructions, comments, or 
warnings at all as he and Danny jumped off and on the running 
board, played on the running board, boosted the 5-year old child 
back up from the running board into the cab of the moving truck, 
1 
and that as he rode and played on the running board he could plainly 
see Defendant LaMark Wignall in the back of the truck, moving to 
place hay bales, and Defendant David Wignall driving the truck. 
(Tr. 9-10, 22) Joel explained that the truck was moving at about 
5 miles per hour all the time, and that the truck was making noise, 
and that there was additional noise from the ferris wheel loader 
as the truck proceeded through the field. (Tr. 12, 23) He explained 
that he had never before been out in the hayfield or riding the 
truck, but that he had no feeling of danger and felt his activities 
were fun. (Tr. 16, 24) He said that the truck had been in the 
hayfield 10 or 15 minutes gathering hay bales at the time Jess 
Kilpack was run over. (Tr. 14) 
Jess Kilpack testified that he recalled no instructions 
as to where he was to ride when the truck arrived at the field, but 
-5-
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that he joined Debbie and Dennis Wilson in the cab (Tr. 29) 
After the truck started down through the field, he saw Joel Kilpack 
and Danny Wilson on the running board, and jumping back and forth 
holding on to the mirror and that he crawled out of the window 
down onto the running board while the truck was moving, and that 
he recalled no instructions or admonishments from either of the 
Defendants about his crawling out of the window. (Tr. 29) He 
testified that Dennis Wilson, the 5-year old, then crawled out 
of the window and that Joel Kilpack and Danny Wilson then pushed 
him back into the cab, but that nothing was said about that pro-
cedure by either of the Defendants, and that after he watched Joel 
and Danny Wilson straightening bales he jumped off the running 
board onto a bale and slipped under the wheels of the partially 
loaded haytruck. (Tr. 29-30) He estimated that he rode the running 
board for 6 to 10 minutes before he jumped and slipped under the 
wheels. (Tr. 30-31) On cross-examination, he said that he had 
been out on the running board about 4 minutes before he jumped anc 
fell under the wheels. (Tr. 34) Exhibit "8", a photograph, 
illustrates the manner in which Jess Kilpack attempted to jump froc 
the running board onto a bale of hay when he slipped under the 
wheels. (Tr. 33; Ex. 8) Jess Kilpack testified that nothing was 
said to him and he could recall nothing being said to Joel Kilpacl 
or Danny Wilson about their riding on the running board, nor when 
the 5-year old was pushed back up into the cab (Tr. 33-34) He 
also testified that the truck was traveling approximately 5 milef 
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per hour before and at the time he jumped off and wa• cru•bed 
under the rear dual wheels, and that the truck had been in OOD-
tinuous motion from the time it started down through the bayfield. 
(Tr. 39) He had never before ridden on the running board of any 
moving vehicle and did not know it was dangerous to do eo. (~. 
41) When asked on cross-examination why he jumped off the running 
board, he stated: " Cause I was going to go play with Joel and 
Danny, straightening the bales." (Tr. 42) Jess testified that he 
could see David Wignall driving the truck while riding the running 
board, and that nothing had been said to him by Joel or Danny 
about jumping off and that he recalled nothing being said by either 
of the Defendants about his activities. (Tr. 44) He did recall 
on ·cross-examination that someone told him to get into the cab after 
the truck arrived at the field. (Tr. 46) 
Defendant David Wignall is the son of Defendant LaMark 
Wignall and the oldest of six children. He was 20 years of age 
at the time of the accident. (Tr. 49-50) 
David Wignall described the equipment and features of 
the flatbed 1964 Dodge ton-and-a-half truck used in the hay bale 
gathering operation. It had a flat bed with sides, but was not 
enclosed in back, and had a running board only on the passenger side 
and outside mirrors; however, the glass was broken out of the mirror 
on the passenger side, but the frame was still attached to the 
truck. (Tr. 53-54; Ex. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8) David Wignall heard 
one of the children ask Defendant LaMark Wignall whether the 
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children could go when the parties were at the Wignall farm house 
prior to leaving in the truck for the field: "One of the kids 
asked Dad if they could go, and he said something like, 'I don't 
care', or something like that." (Tr. 55) David Wignall further 
testified that neither he nor Defendant LaMark Wignall advised 
or informed anyone at the house, including the older sisters of 
some of the five children, or anyone else, of the children's 
desire to be taken to the field and the Defendants willingness 
to take them: that Defendant LaMark Wignall drove the truck to 
the field, where a ferris wheel bale loader was attached, and that 
he then proceeded to drive the truck while Defendant LaMark Wignall 
took a position in the back of the truck to receive and stack the 
bales: and that he could not remember whether anything at all was 
said to the children at that time respecting what they should do 
or what positions they should take. (Tr. 55-56) Defendant David 
Wignall further testified that the truck had come back and forth 
in the field, changing directions one or more times prior to the 
accident; that it was necessary for him to maneuver the truck to 
some extent in a zigzag fashion so that the bales could feed into 
the ferris wheel loader; that he observed and watched the operatioc 
of the bale loader by using the mirror on the driver's side of 
the truck, and that at the time he was somewhat in a hurry to get 
in the hay and was aware that he had the five children along, 
including Jess Kilpack, from the time the truck was driven from t~ 
house to the field (Tr. 56-58) 
-8-
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David Wignall testified that he did observe the acti-
vities of the 9-year old boys jumping up and riding on the runaia9 
board and then off again. (Tr. 58-59) When asked whether he 
also observed the 9-year old children jumping back and forth be-
tween the bales and the running board, Defendant David Wignall 
stated: "No, I didn't. I couldn't tell if they was hopping. 
From what I could tell they were just sticking their foot out and 
kind of kicking the bale." David Wignall admitted that he was 
able to observe a portion of the children's bodies above the bottom 
of the open passenger window, to wit, probably from their shoulders 
on up, and that he recalled that all three of the smaller children, 
Debbie, age 6, Jess, age 7, and Dennis, age 5, crawled out of the 
window and David did say something to them about getting back in, 
to-wit: "I told them to get back in the cab." (Tr. 60) This 
instruction, however, was not given until after the children were 
already out, and thereafter two of the children got back in but 
Jess Kil?ack stayed out on the running board, and that after the 
truck started down the field, the only time he stopped the truck 
was not for the children to get back in the cab, but for the bales 
getting stuck up in the ferris wheel, and that he stopped the truck 
only once or twice the whole time the truck was in the field prior 
to the accident. (Tr. 60-61) Defendant David Wignall said nothing 
at all to the three small children other than just to get back in, 
and made no effort to enforce it, and said nothing at all to the 
two 9-year old children about jumping back and forth on and off the 
-9-
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running board all the while the truck was proceeding, and that 
except for one or two stops for hay bale jam ups, he drove five 
miles an hour. (Tr. 61) Defendant David Wignall testified that 
the bales were arriving at the Ferris Wheel "every five or ten 
seconds" (his deposition) or "between ten to fifteen seconds" 
(his testimony at trial). (Tr. 62-63). Defendant David Wignall 
admitted that he could see Jess Kilpack riding out on the running 
board prior to the time he jumped and that it was "probably about 
fifteen minutes or so" after the children went out the window onto 
the running board to the time of the accident, and that only a 
total of approximately twenty minutes of elapsed time expired from 
the time the truck started in the hay field until the time of the 
accident. (Tr. 63-64) During his deposition, Defendant David 
Wignall testified that it was Jess Kilpack who first crawled out 
the window. (Tr. 64) David Wignall admitted that he regarded the 
five children as being a kind of a nuisance out on the hay bale 
gathering operation. (Tr. 65) 
During David Wignall's examination by his own counsel, 
he further described that it was necessary for the truck to vary 
from a straight course to go out and gather a hay bale; that it 
was necessary for him to look out the window on the driver's side 
to see that the bale was lined up properly; and that the attention 
he was required to devote to the picking up of the hay bales was 
"almost absolute"; that he thought Joel Kilpack may have been out 
on a prior trip; that Danny Wilson had been out on a prior trip, 
-10-
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but on prior trips none of the children were permitted to ride on 
the running board; and that there were many times when he had enough 
time to look to the right to see what the kids were doing on the 
running board, and that what he saw looking to the right "most of 
the time was just Danny and Joel were out standing there. I don't 
know, talking and from what I could see, kicking the bales as they 
would go by". (Tr. 65-67) Further, in answer to questions pro-
pounded by his own counsel, David Wignall stated that at the time 
Jess Kilpack was run over, between a quarter and a half load of 
hay had been gathered; that it took forty-five minutes to an hour 
to get a full load; that the bales would get stuck probably three 
or four times requiring stopping the truck momentarily for each 
full load; that the bales of hay passing the truck on the passenger 
side would vary in distance from the truck from right against the 
running board to probably three or four feet away; and that the 
top of the bales of hay relative to the level of the running board 
on the passenger side would probably be about even or a couple 
of inches either way. (Tr. 67, 69-70) 
Defendant LaMark Wignall testified that he has a B.S. 
Degree in Education from B.Y.U., taught school, primarily the 5th 
grade, but had had occasion to teach children in the 4th grade as 
well and that his duties in the grade school included at times 
supervision of children on the playground and other areas and that 
he was aware of the nature and propensity and capabilities of 
children six, seven, eight and nine years old. (Tr. 73-74) 
-11-
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He stated that he was the owner of the 1974 Dodge Ton & one-half 
truck and he described a few differences in the equipment on the 
truck as depicted in the illustrative photographs from the equip-
ment on the truck at the time of the accident. In this regard, 
the photographs depict a tail gate, also a black portion 
above the sides of the truck and glass in the outside mirror on 
the right-hand side, which items were not present on the truck 
at the time Jess Kilpack was run over. (Tr. 74-75: Exhibits 1,3-6,8! 
LaMark Wignall testified that neither of the two Kilpack 
children had been out in the field on any prior load; that he had 
no discussion with any of the children's mothers prior to taking 
the children to the hay field and no discussions with two older 
qirls at the home about taking the smaller children to the 
hay field and that he was asked for and granted permission to the 
children to go to the field. (Tr. 75-77) As to instructions 
given the children at the time the truck arrived in the field, 
Defendant LaMark Wignall stated: 
"When we stopped the truck in the field 
and the Ferris Wheel was being hooked up I told 
them that they could not ride in the back, since 
hay would be coming in there and that they would 
either have to get in the cab or clear out away 
from the truck into the field". (Tr. 77) 
Defendant Lal1ark Wignall said that the Ferris Wheel 
loader was capable of being raised and lowered in height from the 
back of the truck without requiring the operator to get down on 
the ground and that he would walk back and forth taking the bales 
-12-
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from the Ferris Wheel loader and stacking them first either along 
the side or up at the front. (Tr. 78) He stated that he noticed 
the two older boys out away from the truck some distance into the 
field when the truck first started, but that he did not observe 
anything further respecting the activities of the two nine-year 
olds. (Tr. 78-79) 
As to the activities of the three smaller children 
climbing down onto the running board, Defendant LaMark Wignall 
testified as follows in his deposition and admitted his answers 
were correctly given when examined about the same subject matter 
at trial: 
Question: "You noticed some actiivity of the 
kids getting outside of the truck. One or more 
of the three I guess?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "What did you observe in that 
regard? Where were they and what were they doing?" 
Answer: "I seem to remember that some of 
them were climbing out of the window on to the 
running board of the truck. The height of the 
bed and my activity was with the hay -- I 
wasn't paying attention to what the children 
were doino. I was occupied with the hay, and 
the height of the truck made it difficult for 
me to see them. " 
Q: "Do you recall giving that answer at 
that time?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "Was that answer correctly given?" 
A: "It was correct when given, I guess." 
-13-
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Q: 
your 
running 
or take 
"Okay. With reference to that activity, 
noticing the kids down there on the 
board, did you given them any instructions 
any action at that time?" 
A: "No, I don't think so." (Tr. 80) 
LaMark Wignall said the truck was about one-fourth 
loaded at the time the child was run over and that the truck had 
been in the field about twenty minutes before the accident and 
would have been traveling at a speed of between five to eight 
miles an hour. (Tr. 81) Defendant LaMark Wignall further admitted 
that he had experience with his own six children not hearing or 
not seeming to hear instructions and had had experience on play 
grounds seeing children's interests and activities and being 
around activities appearing fun and exciting and was aware of 
children's interests in being along and participating in anything 
that looks exciting. (Tr. 82) 
Upon cross examination by Defendant's own counsel, 
Defendant LaMark Wignall recalled his explanation in his deposition 
that as he placed hay bales on the truck and because of the height 
of the bed, it was difficult for him to see what was going on on 
the running board, (Tr. 85), and that his observation relative to 
the activities of the children getting down on the running board 
would have been made closer to the beginning of operations rather 
than just before the child was run over. (Tr. 86-87) On redirect 
LaMark Wignall testified as follows: 
Q: "Wasn't it of assistance to have those 
hay bales straightened around to where they could 
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feed directly into the baler?• 
A: "The straighter they were the better, yes.• 
Q: "You were aware that Danny had been out 
earlier doing that and the boys were running ahead 
to do this, were you not? The olders ones?• 
A: "Danny had been out on prior loads. They 
weren't running ahead of the truck, however.• 
Q: "On prior loads?" 
A: "At any time. They were off to the side, 
off in the field, straightening up, making rows.• 
Q: "Yes. Ahead of the truck in the sense 
that after they straightened the bales, the truck 
would come along and pick them up?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "Whether or not it was difficult to see 
the activity of the children, you did see the 
children, some activity, on the running board, did 
you not?" 
A: "Yes, I noticed they were on the running 
board." 
Q: "That was before the accident?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "When its noisy, when children are noisy 
or the machine is noisy, then its necessary to really 
yell to get their attention if they are in a hazard-
ous position, isn't it?" 
A: "Say it again, please." 
Q: "lllhen its noisy, background noise, you have 
to raise your voice at children?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "Have you done that commonly?" 
A: "I have done it." (Tr. 87-88) 
-15-
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The foregoing testimony was the evidence respecting 
the negligence issues. 
The facts relative to the issue of misconduct of the 
jury are as follows: 
The trial court's instruction number 9 directed the jury 
to return a special verdict in the form of written answers to 
special written questions. In th~ last sentence of instruction 
9, the court instructed: 
(R. 44-45) 
"It is your duty to answer each question, 
clearly, frankly and honestly and in accordance 
with the evidence in the case." (R. 54) (Emphasis 
added) 
The form of verdict contains six written questions. 
The jury answered only question number 1 and part of 
question 6. Question 6 was as follows: 
"(6) Without regard to any of the previous 
questions, and your answers thereto, state the 
amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiffs as 
a result of the occurrence." 
"Special damages sustained 
by Plaintiff Jerald Kilpack $ __________ __ 
General damages sustained 
by Plaintiff Jess Kilpack $ __________ __ 
(R. 45) 
The court's instruction number 10 instructed the jury 
that it should determine such amounts of money as would reasonably 
compensate the Plaintiffs for injuries and losses resulting from 
the occurrence, including the reasonable expense of necessary 
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medical care received and the reasonable expense of necessary 
medical care, hospitalization and treatment reasonably certain to 
be needed in the future which the court defined as special dama~•· 
Instruction number 10 further directed the jury that general 
damages consisted on pain, suffering, disabilities or disfigure-
ments and any accompanying mental anquish suffered by the Plaintiff 
Jess Kilpack to date and those reasonably certain to be experienced 
in the future. (R. 55) 
It was stipulated that the Plaintiff Jerald Kilpack had 
incurred $4,738.63 in medical expense for the treatment of Jess 
Kilpack to the time of trial and it was further stipulated that 
if questioned concerning the matter, the Plaintiff Jerald L. Kilpack 
would testify that $856.00 had been incurred in necessary travel 
expense in obtaining medical treatment for a total of $5,594.63 --
the exact sum set forth by the jury as special damages in response 
to the first part of question 6 above quoted. (R. 35, 45) No 
figure was inserted in the blank for general damages. 
Four doctors testified at trial regarding the need for 
continued medical treatment for Jess Kilpack, three for the 
Plaintiff and one for the Defendant. The three doctors who testi-
fied for Plaintiff consisted of Doctor Duane E. Davis, a Urologist, 
Dr. Robert H. Lamb, an Orthopedic Surgeon, and Dr. Dennis D. Thoen, 
a Neurologist. Dr. George W. Middleton, a Urologist, testified 
for Defendant. 
A portion of the testimony of each doctor regarding the 
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nature and extent of the child's permanent injuries and his need 
for continued medical tratment is contained in a forty-page 
partial transcript which the Clerk has identified as page 142 of 
the record. The below references to the Transcript refer to such 
portion of the record. 
Dr. Duane E. Davis, the physician who performed the 
emergency operation on the child just after the accident {Exhibit 
14) and to whom the child has been returned periodically for treat-
ment, testified that the child has a scar or stricture in the ure-
thra at the point where it was severed in the accident which must 
be stretched periodically and that the stricture was a permanent 
condition. {Tr. 13,15) Dr. Davis testified the child would have 
to undergo urethral dilations at at least three month intervals 
for the time being and that his present office costs of such pro-
cedure was $16.50; that such cost was expected to increase; that 
substantial medical risks were associatedwiththe necessity of 
undergoing periodic urethral dilation; and that the child had at 
least a fifty percent chance of ultimately requiring an operation 
known as urethroplasty to reconstruct the stricture area, a pro-
cedure costing from $800.00 to $1,000.00. (Tr. 19-24) 
Dr. Davis explained that even after urethroplasty, the 
medical risks and problems remained the same, since urethroplasty 
was essentially a procedure of substituting a "better" scar for 
one that had become too difficult to treat by means of dilation. 
(Tr. 22-25) 
-18-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dr. Robert H. Lamb testified that the child vas •cer-
tainly likely" to develop traumatic arthritis in his left sacra-
iliac joint and associated problems in his lower lumbar area fro. 
which he would suffer pain and that from an orthopedic and neuro-
muscular standpoint, the child had a JOt permanent partial dis-
ability insofar as his orthopedic and neuromuscular injury vas con-
cerned, which he wwld Ca.Irf i:cespect:ive of the application of available 
medical procedures in an effort to minimize the child's permanent 
problems arising from the effects of the crush injury to his 
pelvis. (Tr. 26-27) 
Dr. Dennis D. Thoen testified that the child's condition 
was such that he was not going to get any more neurological return 
and that the child's musculature would have to try to compensate 
for permanent orthopedic and neurological difficulties. (Tr.28-29) 
Dr. Thoen further testified that there was a strong 
probability that the child would have difficulty with his genital/ 
urinary system in terms of achieving erections later in life, that 
the child already had developed a scoliosis which would require 
orthopedic attention and associated and related problems giving 
the child a condition about the spinal cord called spinal stenosis 
which has very devastating physical effects on its victims. (Tr. 
3 0-3 3) 
Defendant's medical expert, Dr. George Middleton, a 
urologist testified that the odds were that the child would have 
continuing stricture disease; that he thought it unreasonable that 
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that the child should be dilated 
every three months for sixty years and that he would prefer to 
try to repair the stricture by means of urethroplasty (Tr. 34-
35) 
When asked his opinion as to the probability the child 
would have to undergo urethroplasty, Dr. Middleton stated: 
"judging by the fact that he has been dilated every three months, 
its almost a certainty." (Tr. 35) 
The facts relative to the voir dire issues are as 
follows: 
After the first jury was questioned by the court, 
Plaintiff's counsel approached the bench concerning other ques-
tions in written form which Plaintiff desired to have the court 
propound to the jury. (Tr. 2-3) The trial court declined to 
itself ask any of the questions, except that the court did ask a 
question which it evidently deemed sufficient to cover the issue 
of whether the jurors were associated with or owned stock in any 
casualty insurance company, to wit: "Do any of you own any stock 
in any corporate enterprise?" (Tr. 2) 
As to the other questions Plaintiff wanted the court 
to put to the jury, the court required counsel for Plaintiff to 
state the question in front of the jury so that the court could 
decide whether or not it would be put to the panel. (Tr. 3) 
The court then permitted Plaintiff's counsel to ask the court to 
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instruct the jury that sometimes insurance exists and sometimes 
it does not exist in personal injury actions and to inquire of 
the jurors as a group whether any juror owned stock in any casu-
alty insurance company or is in the business or has previously 
been in the business of solicitmgfor the sale of insurance or had 
previously been in the business of adjusting claims or had other-
wise in the past or present been an officer, employee or member 
of an insurance company. (Tr. 3) The court inquired whether 
any juror would answer the question yes, and one juror indicated 
ownership of some stock in a National Variable Life company. The 
court did not follow up on the matter, but required Plaintiff's 
counsel to ask the court to inquire of the jury as to other 
matters, nos:t of which requests the court denied, to wit: inquiry 
as to the jurors acquaintance or non-acquaintance from their 
background and experience with the conduct and characteristics of 
young children; inquiry concerning ability of individual jurors 
based on their background in assessing injuries to a child; inquiry 
as to jurors personal philosophy or feelings against the fault 
system and in awarding monetary compensation if liability is 
found; inquiry concerning distaste of jurors for medical evidence 
concerning the injuries to the child. (Tr. 4-5) The court did 
grant counsel's request to inquire of the jury as to their per-
sonal involvement in farming operations and ascertained that only 
three of the jurors had no farming experience, but the court 
would not permit any further inquiry and in particular refused 
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Plaintiff's request to ask the jurors whether their farming exper-
iences would give them a problem in properly listening to and eval-
uating Plaintiff's case where Defendants were engaged in farming 
operations at the time. The court refused to inquire of the jury 
on that matter, prefering instead to simply tell the jury they 
could answer the following with a yes or no answer: 
"Do any of you have any reason why you feel 
you cannot on this case l~sten to the evidence, 
the law as I state it to you at the conclusion 
of the evidence, and based solely on that evidence 
and that law and nothing else, render(ing) a fair 
and just verdict as between the parties?" (Tr. 6-7) 
Of course no juror responded in the affirmative. 
The court did ask the jurors whether any had been sued 
or had brought suit because of injuries and one juror responded 
that she had been involved in a law suit with doctors and simply 
did not like doctors. The court said "would that fact cause you 
to be predisposed to find for or against either party without re-
gard to the evidence and the law?" The juror did not directly res-
pond to that, but only stated "well, there were Provo doctors I 
imagine these are Payson ones". And the court thereafter cut off 
further inquiry. (Tr. 7-8) 
After Joel Kilpack testified, counsel for the Defendants 
made a motion for a mistrial on the ground Plaintiff had injected 
the matter of insurance by asking whether ony of the jurors were 
stockholders in a casualty insurance company. (Tr. 9) The court 
granted the motion, stating: "!·1r. Cook, I have been down this roac 
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so many times it gives me a sick feeling in the diaphram.• (Tr.lO) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEITHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE NOR REASONABLE 
INFERENCES SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
THAT NEITHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT 
The trial court instructed the jury that negligence was 
a failure of a person to do something a reasonably careful person 
would do or the act of a person in doing something a reasonably 
careful person would not do measured by all the circumstances then 
existing, (R. 48); that it was the duty of a driver of a motor 
vehicle to use reasonable care under the circumstances in driving 
the vehicle to avoid danger to himself and others and to observe 
and be aware of the conditions at the time and place and under the 
circumstances then existing and in the same instruction further 
instructed the jury that: 
"In this connection it is necessary to exercise 
greater caution for the protection and safety of a 
young child than for an adult person. One dealing 
with children must anticipate the ordinary behavior 
of children. The fact that they usually cannot and 
do not exercise the same degree of prudence for 
their own safety as adults, they often are thought-
less and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a 
degree of vigilance and caution commensurate with 
such circumstances in dealing with children." (R.Sl) 
Plaintiff submits that the trial court should have taken 
judicial notice of the hazard to small children of permitting them 
to ride on the running board of the hay truck bouncing through 
an open field immediately ahead of the rear dual wheels of that 
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truck and permitting some of them to jump back and forth, crawl 
in and out the window and drag along, hanging onto the truck. See 
Butler vs. Sports Haven International,563 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1977), 
in which this Court held judicial notice should be taken of the 
hazard to small children of an open swimming pool. The trial court 
should have granted Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on 
the issue of the liability of the DefenGants because reasonable 
persons, conscientiously and deliberately applying the law could 
not conclude that Defendants exercised reasonable care i.e. greater 
than ordinary caution for the protection and safety of the five smal: 
children and reasonably exercised a degree of vigilance and caution 
commensurate with the circumstances when they took five small child-
ren out with them to the hay field knowing full well their attentioc 
would be directed to gathering hay bales; that the truck and bale 
loader would be noisy; that the children had not been out to the 
hay field before and had no experience, except for one older boy 
who had not been on the running board before anyway, and then per-
mitted children of the age of 5, 6 and 7 years to actually crawl 
out the window of the moving truck and down on the running board 
and observe them in that perilous position and do absolutely nothu: 
to prevent the inevitable from occurring. 
Submitting the issue of Defendant's negligence to the 
jury under the circumstances was tantamount to inviting them to 
speculate that farmers have special privileges above all. Perhaps 
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most of the members of the jury were closely associated with 
farmers or visualized themselves in busy farming operations vbere 
it would be inconvenient to be bothered with taking thought about 
the physical welfare of small inexperienced, excited children. 
Knowingly permitting them to play on the outside of a mo•ing 
farm truck for a good ten or fifteen minutes before one of thea 
was crushed was grossly negligent. 
Plaintiff submits that not even "a mere scintilla• of 
evidence arises from the testimony, which is undisputed in its 
material particulars, which could in reason be argued to support 
the proposition that the Defendants did in fact use reasonable 
care under the circumstances and did exercise that greater degree 
of caution for the protection and safety of a young child required 
by law. The jury's verdict of no negligence cannot be sustained. 
The trial court judgment of no cause of action and its refusal to 
grant judgment on the liability issues notwithstanding the verdict 
must be reversed even under the rigorous standards for review of 
the jury's verdict set forth in the cases of McCloud vs. Baum, 569 
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977); Koer vs. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 
Helman vs. Sacred Heart Hospital, 62 Wash.2d 136, 381 P.2d 605 
cited in Hyland vs. St. Marks Hospital, 427 P.2d 736 (Utah 1967) 
(dissenting opinion of Justice Callister). 
POINT II 
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE NOR REASONABLE INFERENCES 
EXIST UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND 
JESS KILPACK GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
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Plaintiff's primary point is that under no reasonable 
view of the evidence could the jury have found the small excited 
7-year old child guilty of contributory negligence so the trial 
court should not have submitted the issue of the child's contribu-
tory negligence to the jury and that upon retrial, the sole issue 
which should be submitted to the jury is the issue of damages. 
If this Court does not so hold, then Plaintiff urges the 
Court to direct the lower court to instruct the jury, upon retrial: 
1) That the law presumes the child incapable of con-
tributory negligence, a presumption Defendants must overcome by 
reasonable evidence to the contrary, and, 
2) That Defendants had a legal duty to observe extra 
care for the child's safety once they knew he was in a position of 
obvious peril on the running board outside Defendant's moving hay 
truck. 
As to Plaintiff's primary point, Plaintiff submits that 
a jury could not reasonably find the little seven-year old child 
acted unreasonably for a seven-year old who had never been out on 
a hay truck before, who had never ridden outside a truck before, 
who had received no instructions, direction or warning about the 
matter, and who watched an older brother and older cousin for 
some time before trying to follow them. 
The only reasonable, conrnon sense conclusion that can be 
arrived at from the evidence is that the little seven-year old boy 
did exactly what would be expected of a younger brother anxious 
-26-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to help and do as his older brother and cousin were doing. No 
7-year old child would have had any appreciation at all of the 
fact that the dual wheels of the truck were followinq just a few 
feet behind and extending as far out as that runninq board. No 
7-year old would have any idea that if he fell while climbing out 
or riding or after jumping he would be run over by the trucks rear 
dual tires as it manuvered and rolled through the field. Such things 
were totally out of his experience and could not in reason be ex-
pected to be in the child's mind. It was a brand new experience 
for him. He could see how his older brother and cousin were par-
ticipating and helping by arranging hay bales. The child was only 
2~ months beyond the protection of a conclusive presumption of his 
incapability of contributory negligence discussed below. He was 
small, very young, totally inexperienced, and without instruction. 
As to the latter, David Wignall testified that all he did was to say 
once to the children that they should get back in the cab, but 
that was after the 7-year old was already on the running board of 
the noisy truck and obviously totally insufficient for he knew 
Jess did not get back in but rode back out there for another ten 
minutes or so. Nothing could be plainer than that the child did 
not hear any such instruction and nothing is more common in the 
life of adults commonly dealing with young children than the exper-
lence of having those young chilGren not hear instructions when 
their attention is diverted elsewhere especially in a new exciting 
circumstance. 
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The conduct of the child was not unreasonable for a 
small excited 7-year old child under totally new circumstances as 
a matter of law. 
In all events, if this Court does not limit retrial to 
the issue of damages, Plaintiff is entitled to have the jury pro-
perly instructed respecting defendant's contributory negligence 
defense. 
Jess Kilpack was born April 1, 1969 (see first page of 
exhibit 14) and was just 2~ months beyond the age of seven on 
June 21, 1976 when he was crushed beneath the wheels of Defendant's 
partially loaded ton and a half hay truck. 
In Nelson vs. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 
P.2d 255 (1940) this Court held: 
1) Ordinarily a child under seven years of age is con-
clusively presumed not guilty of contributory negligence. 
2) Between the ages of seven and fourteen in the absence 
of a showing to the contrary, an infant is assumed not to have the 
same consciousness of danger and the same judgment in avoiding it 
as an adult, so that, where the infant is between seven and fourtee: 
years of age, defendant has the burden of rebutting a legal pre-
sumption of incapability of contributory negligence. 
Contrary to Nelson, the trial court refused to instruct 
the jury that the injured child was presumed incapable of contri-
butory negligence. (R. 86) Instead, the trial court merely in-
structed the jury that Defendants had the burden of persuadinq 
them that Jess Kilpack was nealiaent. ( R. 50) 
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The trial court further refused to instruct the jury that 
when a child is known to be in a situation of danger, there is a 
duty to observe extra caution for his safety. (R. 88) Such an 
instruction was requested under the authority of Rivas vs. Pacific 
Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964), because Defen-
dant David Wignall admitted he saw the 7-year old crawl out the 
window of the moving truck down onto the running board and so knew 
he was out there. (R. 143 - Tr. 58-61) Defendant LaMark Wignall 
also admitted seeing the children crawl down onto the running board 
and knew they were there. (R. 143 - Tr. 79-80, 88) 
In Rivas, this Court specifically held: 
. When a child is known to be in a 
situation of possible danger, there is a duty 
to observe extra caution for his safety." 
Rivas vs. Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 
397 P.2d 990, 991 (1964). 
The lower court also erred in instructing the jury in 
effect that the child had an absolute duty to watch out for himself: 
"A person in or about a moving motor vehicle 
must make reasonable use of his faculties for his 
own protection. He is required to keep a proper 
lookout for his own safety and to use that degree 
of care which a reasonable, careful person would 
exercise measured by all the circumstances then 
existing. He does not have a duty, however, to 
look for danaer when there is no reason to 
apprehend any." (R. 52) (emphasis added) 
There was no justification for hanging that absolute requi-
rement around the neck of the 7-year old child, contrary to his 
actual duty (which the lower court did include in a different 
instruction. (R. 53) 
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To summarize, if the defense of contributory negligence 
remains in the case for retrial, Plaintiff is entitled to have the 
jury instructed that: 
1) The child is presumed incapable of contributory 
negligence, and 
2) When the child was observed to be in a hazardous 
position, Defendants incurred a duty to exercise extra caution for 
his safety, and 
the lower court should not instruct the jury that the child had an 
absolute duty to watch out for himself on the moving vehicle, 
contrary to the child's actual duty to exercise only the same care 
as would be expected of children the same age, intelligence and 
experience in similar circumstances. 
POINT III 
IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JURY, MIS-
CONDUCT OF THE JURY, INADEQUATE DAMAGES, INSUFFICIENCY OF 
THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT AND ERROR IN LAW MA..'WATE 
THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL 
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
the court may grant a party a new trial on all or part of the iss~s 
for certain causes, including irregularity in the proceedings of 
the jury, misconduct of the jury, inadequate damages, insufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict and error in law. Rule 
59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial. Plaintiff was and is entitled to a new trial on the 
damage issue for the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the JUry. The 
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court's first stock instruction directed the jury to follow the 
law and to determine the facts, not arbitrarily but with sincere 
judgment and sound discretion. (R. 46) Following closing argu-
ments, the case was submitted to the jury at approximately 11:55 
a.m., Wednesday, October 4, 1978. The jury announced that it had 
arrived at a verdict approximately one hour to one hour fifteen 
minutes later at the conclusion of the jury's lunch period. (R. 34) 
It is manifest from the incompleted special verdict and the short 
time over the noon hour during which the jury "deliberated" that 
the jury could not have sincerely and conscientiously considered 
the case and followed the court's instructions, erroneous though 
some of them were, but instead rapidly and arbitrarily determined 
the Defendants would not be liable, quite regardless of the evidence. 
2. Misconduct of the iu~v. The trial court's instruc-
tion 9 told the jury it was its duty to answer written questions: 
" ... Each answer is to be written in the 
space provided after each question. 
It is your duty to answer each 
clearly, frankly an onestly and ~n 
with the evidence in the case." (R. added) 
The form of verdict contained six written questions. 
The jury answered only question number 1, ignored questions 2, 3, 
4 and 5 and inserted an answer in only part of question 6, which 
specifically directed the jury, as prefaced, as follows: 
"Without regard to any of the previous 
questions and your answers thereto, state.the 
amount of damages sustained by the Pla~nt~ffs 
as a result of the occurrence: 
Special damage sustained 
by Plaintiff Jerald Kilpack $ __________ __ 
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General damages sustained 
by Jess Kilpack $ __________ __ (R. 45) 
The jury ignored the preface above quoted, inserted no 
sum in the blank for general damages and wrote in the blank for 
special damages only that figure stipulated as the special damages 
incurred prior to trial increased by the amount of travel expense 
it was stipulated Jerald Kilpack w0uld testify about if called on 
the subject. (See R. 35, 45) 
Thus the jury totally ignored not only the evidence 
concerning the permanence, nature and severity of the child's 
injuries, but the medical evidence given by all four doctors that 
the child would need continuing urethral dilations and probably 
urethroplasty and ongoing expensive orthopedic and neuromuscular 
care. ( Tr . 13 , 15 , 19-2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6-2 7 , 3 0- 3 3 , 3 4-3 5 l 
It was manifest jury misconduct for the jury to disregard 
the court's instructions, particularly its instruction as to how 
to approach the damage question. Had the jury properly applied 
the court's instructions, it would have been impossible for the 
jury to have reached its results. Eikelberger vs. Tolotti, 574 P.2: 
277 (Nev. 1978); Town of Jackson vs. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1977 · 
The jury abused its prerogatives and ignored or misapplied 
proven facts and the law given to it by the tr;al court. Lund vs. 
Phillins net:rnl.<>ll"' Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P. 2d 952 (Utah 1960) · 
3. Inadequate damac:es appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudic~. As stated above, t~ 
jury ignored the instructions of the court, struck a line thruuc! 
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the blank for general damages, ignored entirely the extensive 
testimony describing the child's injuries, the lengthy emergency 
operation required to save his life and the extensive permanent 
injuries to his uro-genital system, nerves, bones and musculature, 
and ignored the testimony given by all doctors that further medical 
treatment for life would be required. The manifest inadequacy of 
the jury's damage finding itself bespeaks disregarding of instruc-
tions and disregard of the evidence or a misapprehension of the same 
or shows that the verdict was influenced by passion or prejudice --
perhaps by an assumption that our local farmer should not be charged 
with responsibility or "such an accident could happen to any of us 
farmers" or some other such notion. The patent inadequacy of the 
damage assessment certainly reflects prejudice or bias against the 
out-of-town Plaintiffs, plainly requiring a new trial under the 
principle of Saltas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940). 
4. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. 
The discussion under Point I and the recitation of facts showing 
Defendants'utter disregard for the welfare of the small children, 
particularly the Plaintiff, is applicable to this point as well as 
to the point that Defendants were negligent as a matter of law. A 
review of the undisputed evidence, particularly the admissions and 
testimony given by Defendants leads to the inescapable conclusion 
Defendants did not take garden variety, normal precautions to keep 
the small children they took to the hay field out of harm's way. They 
failed to shut down the truck when they observed the children 
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crawling out the window and down onto the running board and failed 
to adequately and sufficiently instruction and caution the children 
on what they could and could not do during the bale gathering 
operation. 
The evidence was plainly insufficient to justify the 
jury's verdict of no negligence on the part of Defendants. Arbi-
trariness, abuse or mistake is evid~nt in the jury's verdict and 
the result reached is clearly offensive to any objective sense of 
justice. Holmesvs. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 1967): 
Stack vs. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594 (Utah 1950) and 
Hyland vs. St. Marks Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (Utah 
1967). 
5. Error in the law. The discussion under Point I is 
again applicable,requiring a new trial. The court should have 
determined the issue of Defendants' liability as a matter of law 
once the evidence was in and it became absolutely clear that 
reasonable minds could not differ as to the proposition that Def-
endants absolutely ignored their duty to the small excited children 
they permitted to accompany them on the hazardous bale gathering 
operation. It was error in law for the trial court to submit the 
negligence issues to the jury. So doing merely permitted Defen-
dants to argue to the jury that it could decide that the action 
was simply one of those unavoidable happenings that shoulc1 ""t be 
blamed on anyone because accidents happen to everyone, quite ionor-
ing the court's instructions as to the legal duties involved and 
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to further invite the jury to blame the accident on the child'• 
sister or mother or something else absolutely extraneous to the 
evidence. Leaving that issue open under the facts of this ca•e 
permitted the jury to in effect disregard the court's instruction• 
number 1 and 2 and to fail to apply instructions number 6 and 8 
regarding the respective duty of care of the small, excited, 
inexperienced children and the heavy duty of care placed on the 
adults operating the truck and machines. It permitted the jury 
to accept Defendant's argument that the child should never have 
been taken to the farm in the first place, or perhaps should have 
somehow been warned by his parents to anticipate that his Uncle 
might permit him to go to the hay field but to go in no event, 
whether or not invited. The evidence was clear that the small 
seven year old would not have been crushed under the truck's wheels 
but for Defendant's obvious fault in knowingly allow him to crawl 
out the window, down on the running board and to ride and play 
there in a position obviously fraught with peril for a full ten 
to fifteen minutes without stopping the truck, without warning and 
without even the protection of admonishment or appropriate instruc-
tion. Leaving the fault issue open permitted the jury to speculate 
that in Utah County at leas~ rapid gathering of hay bales is more 
important than life and limb of five small excited children who 
could be ignored to fend for themselves. Perhaps the jury simply 
assumed the child's inj~ries were covered by some form of medical 
insurance (which is not the caseh and thus felt they could rapidly 
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adjourn after lunch at County expense to go out on the Elk Hunt 
or to attend to other more pressing duties without really reviewing 
the instructions or the evidence or the damages. 
In all events, the verdict is plainly against the law 
which requires adults to anticipate the actions of children and 
to take reasonable precautions under the circumstances to prevent 
small children in their charge from being hurt in hazardous condi-
tions created by the adults which the child's small size, limited 
physical ability, non-existence prior experience and limited judg-
ment simply did not permit the children to appreciate and properly 
or appropriately handle by themselves. 
It was manifest error of law for the trial court to deny 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE LOI.offiR COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
A MISTRIAL AND IN DISCHARGING THE FIRST JURY 
Defendants' answers to interrogatories disclosed that 
Defendant LaMark Wignall had in force a Utah Farm Bureau Policy 
and that coverage under the policy of the Plaintiff's claim was 
not disputed. (R. 131-132) 
This Court has held in accordance with the general rule 
that prospective jurors may be questioned on voir dire respecting 
their interest in or connection with liability insurance companies. 
Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932); Saltas vs. Affle: 
99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); and 'lorrison '.'S. Perr'/• 10·1 lita' 
151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943); see also 1\nnot., "Adm1ssibilit'.' of 
Evidence and Propriety and Effect of Quest1ons, Statements, Co~~· 
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etc., Tending to Show that Defendant in Personal Injury or Death 
Action Carries Liability Insurance, "4 ALR 2d 761, 792 (1949). 
In Balle vs. Smith,this Court held that plaintiff waa 
entitled to learn whether any juror is interested in or connected 
with any casualty insurance company which may be interested in the 
case, either as officer, employee, member or stockholder, but that 
no impression should be conveyed that there was or was not insur-
ance covering defendant's liability. If the jurors answer the 
question in the negative, that should be the end of the inquiry. 
Balle vs. Smith does not discuss the permissible limits of followup 
questions should a juror answer in the affirmative. 
In Saltas vs. Affleck, supra., this Court said: 
"Reasonable latitude should be given parties 
in ascertaining what affiliations jurors have with 
an interested party. Here the matter should end." 
Saltas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176, 179 
(1940). 
The inquiry Plaintiff requested the court to out to the 
jury in this case certainly did not go beyond permissible limits: 
"THE COURT: Do counsel have other questions 
they wish to put to the jury panel for challenge 
for cause: Mr. Cook? 
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. Perhaps I could --
THE COURT: Do you have any questions you wish 
me to put to them? 
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. Mav I aooro~ch the 
bench on the question of subject matter for voir dire? 
(Whereupon, Mr. Cook approached the bench and handed 
a document to the Court.) 
THE COURT: This is interesting. What questions 
do you want me to put to the jury panel? This panel 
was qualified some ti~e ago. 
MR. COOK: Yes, I appreciate that. 
THE COURT: The questions of their citizenship 
and their residence and so on hnve been resolved. 
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MR. COOK: Yes. Number 3, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do any of you --
MR. COOK: Through the balance then would be 
appropriate in my judgment. 
THE COURT: Do any of you own any stock in any 
corporate enterprise? 
MELVINA CROPPER: What do you mean by that? 
THE COURT: Any General Motors stock? 
JUROR CROPPER: Yes, First Security Bank. We 
own some in Mountain Bell. We own some in J. C. 
Penney. 
THE COURT: That takes care of that, does it 
not, Mr. Cook? 
MR. COOK: No, Your Honor, not the whole sub-
ject matter, and this is a proper inquiry. 
TilE COURT: l'lill counsel approach the bench? 
(Counsel approached the bench and discussion was had 
off the record.) 
I will let you ~ake your record. 
Do you have any other questions, Mr. Cook, you 
want me to ask? You state the question and I will 
decide whether it's going to be put to the panel or 
not. 
MR. COOK: Thank you, Your Honor. I request 
the Court to ask the jury the followi~g and to 
instruct the jury that with respect to pecuniary 
interest sometimes insurance exists and so~eti~es 
it does not exist in personal injury actions, such 
as this one today. It is therefore custo~ary and 
often done by the Court to inquire of the jurors as 
a group whether any juror owns stock in any cas-
ualty insurance company or is in the business or 
has previously been in the business of solicitlnq 
for the sale of insurance or has previously been 
in the business of adjustinq claims or has otherwise 
in the past or present been an officer, c~cloyee, 
or member of an insurance com[J~l!1~: 
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THE COURT: Would any of you answer that 
question yes? 
Yes, Sir? 
JUROR ANDREW JOLLY: I don't know if this 
pertains to it. I own a small amount of stock in 
NationalVariable Life. I think it's a life in-
surance company. I don't think it deals with --
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Cook. (R. 142 -
Tr. 3-4) 
Defendants' motion for a mistrial was based solely on 
Plaintiff's counsel asking the court to ask the jury the question 
above quoted. (R. 142 - 9-10) 
The lower court refused to follow the practice suggested 
by Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in Morrison vs. Perry, 
104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 72 (1943) which was that the trial judge 
himself should announce that sometimes insurance exists and 
sometimes it does not; that the court makes it a practice to 
interrogate veniremen en masse as to whether they own stock in 
or are in the business of soliciting for liability insurance or 
are in the business of adjusting claims and should further tell the 
jury that the jury is not to be concerned with the issue of 
whether or not liability insurance exists. Justice Wolfe further 
suggested that if an affirmative answer is given as to a juror's 
connection with a casualty insurer, he should be asked with which 
company he is affiliated or in which he owns stock and whether 
the fact of such connection would influence him in reaching a 
verdict. If not, the subject should not be further pursued 
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absent special circumstances. Justice Wolfe suggested that 
counsel should advise the court as to any suggested further 
questions outside the hearing of the veniremen, but that the 
court itself should conduct the examination as a part of standard 
practice and include an admonishment to the jury that its verdict 
should be rendered without regard to the existence of liability 
insurance. Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, 
(1943). 
The lower court obviously abused its discretion in 
granting the mistrial instead of following the procedure outlined 
by Judge Wolfe in the Morrison vs. Perry case. The lower court 
forced counsel for Plaintiff to ask the court to ask the question 
in the presence of the jury, refusing to itself put the question 
to the jury and to further instruct the jury as indicated proper 
by the Morrison vs. Perry case. 
Plaintiff submits that this Court should now decide that 
examination of jurors for pecuniary interest in the casualty 
insurer should be undertaken by the Court in every case where 
liability insurance exists, including but not limited to cases li~ 
the instant case which is not an on highway motor vehicle case, b~ 
case in which the vehicle's insurance applies. Pecuniary interest 
ought to be recognized as including jurors interest as insureds 
paying premiums to the defendant's insurer. 
It is particularly important that this Court clarify 
the matter, for reasons beyond the results in the instant case. 
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First, the question of what insurance company is de-
fending the case is probably in the minds of the jurors anyway. 
all or most of whom will have driven to court in an au~ile 
upon which insurance is mandated by the Utah Safety Responsibility 
Act, Section 41-12-1, et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Second, this Court can and should take judicial notice 
that the insurance industry has been hard at work for some years 
prosecuting a media and legislative campaign designed to permanently 
implant in the minds of the public, particularly including those 
members of the public who become jurors, the notion that the 
tort liability system is grossly at fault, and that premium paying 
jurors are unwittingly implicated in pulling exborbitant premiums 
out of the public's pocket and their own pocket via huge awards 
for unmeritorious cases. See for example the discussion in Juris 
Doctor, December 1978-January 1979 issue, page 30, describing ads 
placed by Aetna Life & Casualty describing what the insurance 
industry claims is a runaway trend toward the granting of excess-
ive unjustified jury awards in accident cases, notwithstanding the 
money to pay such awards comes from uninvolved parties such as 
jurors, who of course must themselves pay liability insurance pre-
miums. Judicial notice should further be taken of the apparent 
effectiveness of the insurance industry's campaign reflected by 
the fact that it is now defense counsel and not plaintiff's counsel 
who requests a jury, particularly in Utah County. It is fair to 
say that the result of permitting nothing to be said about insur-
ance is to invite the jury to assume that had insurance existed, 
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the case would have been settled, or since the case was not 
settled, the Plaintiff probably has an unmeritorious case or is 
unduly greedy, else the case would have settled. The cards are 
thus unfairly stacked against Plaintiff. This problem is especial~ 
accute in a case like this one where the jurors from a rural 
area will have had farming experience or are related to farmers 
and all are adults like the Defendants, and certainly if the jury 
felt that Defendants were without insurance protection, they would 
sympathize with their problem in paying any monetary award when 
the jurors themselves could visualize children becoming injured 
in their own or relatives farming operations. 
Since the carrying of liability insurance is in effect 
mandated by Utah's Safety Responsibility Act, and the jurors all 
drive to Court in cars carrying that mandatory insurance, and 
insurance has become so common anyway that the average person 
serving on a jury is perfectly aware of its existence in many, 
if not all, situations, ana so will be speculating and guessing 
about it anyway, instruction and inquiry must be made into juror's 
interests in insurers and they must be told that the liability and 
damage instructions must be applied whether or not there is insur-
ance, regardless of media coverage of industry propaganda, or their 
own biases about the matter. Actually, since the fact of insurance 
coverage is now deemed relevant to t!1e settlement of cases, 
certainly a case can be made that it is also relevant to the amount 
of damages which should be awarded. If a de~endant is finanriall~ 
-41-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
responsible up to $50,000 or $100,000, that is a fact of great 
importance. If the insurance limit is $50,000, a defendant vho 
negligently causes $500,000 in damages will usually take out 
bankruptcy to avoid paying the difference anyway. 
In this regard, Plaintiff submits that there is no 
actual empirical evidence to support the supposition that once 
a jury gets the idea that Defendant is covered with some kind of 
insurance, the jury is automatically going to irresponsibly ignore 
all of the Court's instructions on liability and simply assess 
damages in the amount of the coverage. Insurance has now been around 
a long time and is universaJly known and used. It is demeaning to 
the jury to suggest it cannot and will not appropriately handle 
even very specific advice as to the fact and amount of liability 
insurance coverage. 
In any event, if the Court does not decide that the fact 
and amount of liability insurance with appropriate cautionary 
explanation and instruction should now be covered as a matter of 
course, this Court should at least rule that the lower court erred 
in granting the mistrial where the only question that was asked 
was whether any of the jurors had a pecuniary or employment interest 
in a casualty insurance company. 
POINT IV 
THE SUBJECT MATTER UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO 
VOIR DIRE THE JURY WAS MATERIAL AND PROPER 
Rule 47(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the 
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trial court the right to voir dire the jury, but requires the 
court to permit the parties to supplement the examination by such 
further inquiry as is material and proper or to itself submit to 
the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or 
their attorneys as are material and proper. 
The lower court proceeded with manifest impatience to 
require counsel in the presence of the jury to ask the Court to put 
certain questions to the jury theretofore submitted to the judge 
in writing and then, manifesting the same impatience, the effect 
of which was certainly not lost on the jury, refused to make inquiry 
into the jury's acquaintance with conduct and characteristics of 
young children, the jury's acquaintance with and ability to assess 
injuries to a small child; any personal philosophies held by 
jurors or feelings against the fault system that might give them 
a problem in following the court's instructions that if liability 
should be found a reasonble and proper and fair monetary compen-
sation should be awarded; the jury's possible aversion or distaste 
for description of traumatic injuries; the jurors experience as 
farmers and whether that would give any of them difficulty in 
properly evaluating and giving proper consideration to Plaintiff's 
case where the Defendants were farmers. (R. 142 - Tr. 4-8) 
The trial court basically took the position that it was 
not necessary to allow counsel for Plaintiffs to inquire into any 
voir dire subject matter long enough to qet qenuine responses as t: 
juror background matters which would obviously have an effect en 
the way they vio1,·ecl the evidence or oral commitments frolll the ·· 
-43-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that they would conscientiously listen to the evidence and the 
instructions and give Plaintiff's case fair consideration regard-
less of personal experiences a proper voir dire would require 
them to recognize in their own background which might give them 
a bias. 
The trial court presumed instead that the whole subject 
matter could be covered rapidly and sufficiently with the following 
kinds of inquiry. 
"Ladies and Gentlemen, you have heard a 
little bit about what this case is about by way 
of preliminary proceeding. You have heard no 
evidence. Do any of you,and I won't press this 
further than a yes or now answer, do any of you 
have any reason why you feel that you cannot on 
this case listen to the evidence, the law as I 
stated it to you at the conclusion of the evidence, 
and based solely on that evidence and that law and 
nothing else, rendering a fair and just verdict 
as between the parties? 
••• 
Have any of you ever brought suit or been 
sued because of injuries to somebody?" 
(Juror Melvina Cropper held up her hand) 
"THE COURT: Would that fact cause you to 
be predisposed to find for or against either 
party in this case? Mrs. Peterson? 
JUROR MARY PETERSON: I don't know if this 
counts or not, but we have been involved in a 
law suit over a building with some doctors and 
I don't like them. Those doctors. 
THE COURT: Would that fact cause you to 
be predisposed to find for or against either 
party without regard to the evidence and the 
law? 
JUROR PETERSON: Well, they were Provo doctors, 
I imagine these are Payson ones. (They were not.) 
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THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Cook?" 
(R. 142 - Tr. 6-8) 
The problem with rushing things along in such fashion 
is that jurors are simply not able to assess and evaluate their 
own feelings and prejudices in any meaningful manner. 
No juror is going to affirmatively answer a question 
such as "would that fact cause you to be predisposed to find for 
or against either party without regard to the evidence and the 
law?" 
Then for the Court to exhibit impatience and hostility 
towards counsel's efforts to make reasonable inquiries which would 
enable the jurors to come to terms with their feelings and atti-
tudes regarding the subject matter in the case is to tell the 
jurors counsel is certainly out of line and someone not to be put 
up with very long, and, inferentially, someone not to be listened 
to--someone who is perhaps wasting the valuable time of this court, 
etc., and that is hardly conducive to getting off on the right 
foot with the jury. 
Plaintiff most earnestly therefore requests this Court 
to hold that "material and proper questioning" consists, as a 
minimum, in proceeding with enough voir dire in a non-hostile 
environment to permit counsel for both sides to start the trial 
with some reasonable confidence that the jury has at least been 
given a genuine opportunity to do a little soul searching about 
matters of implied bias and to start hearing the evidence with 
a genuine commitment to the system of justice, having been proper: 
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encouraged to make a genuine effort to lay aside all hostilities 
and biases brought to the Courtroom, and genuinely eo, as a 
matter of faithful participation in the proceeding. 
It is manifestly impossible for the objective of voir 
dire to be achieved by inquiring in substance, •do all of you 
feel you can be fair?" Of course, no one is going to speak up 
in front of the group and say they cannot be fair. Such pushed, 
rushed inquiry is simply worse than nothing so far as the intent 
of Rule 47 (a) is concerned. 
It was material prejudicial error for the lower court to 
preclude counsel for Plaintiff from inquiring into the material 
and proper matters above set forth. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts, which were largely undisputed, and were 
not disputed in any material particular, make Defendants negligence 
clear as a matter of law. It was error for the lower court to 
submit the issue of Defendants' negligence to the jury. 
The undisputed evidence leaves no room for reasonable 
minds to disagree that Defendants did not meet their burden of 
proving the seven-year old child contributorily negligent. The 
defense of negligence should not have been and should not be 
submitted to the jury. The case should be remanded for a retrial 
upon the issue of damages only. 
If the Court does not decide the new trial should be 
limited to the issue of damages, Plaintiff is entitled to a new 
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trial on all issues in any event because: 
1) The jury was improperly instructed as to the 
child's duty. 
2) The jury obviously did not consider or follow 
the court's instructions on liability. 
3) The jury failed to follow the court's instruc-
tions with respect to answering the damage questions. 
4) The jury gave manifestly inadequate damages 
apparently under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
5) The evidence is not sufficient to justify 
the no cause of action verdict. 
The Court erred in declaring a mistrial and discharging 
the first jury and in failing to accord Plaintiff proper voir 
dire upon material and proper matters. 
This Court should decide that the subject of insurance 
should be made a matter of proper jury instruction by the Court 
in all cases where liability insurance exists. 
Upon retrial, the lower Court should be instructed to 
allow sufficient opportunity for voir dire upon matters of bias 
without impatience or hostility, and to permit counsel for both 
sides to inquire as to matters of actual or implied biases 
held by the jurors appropriately and to obtain genuine oral 
commitments from the jurors to recognize and deliberately lay 
aside what unconscious biases thev miqht have affecting the case 
for the purpose of doino 1ustl~C in the cause. 
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1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 
OOK 
torney for Plaintiff 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Served the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing two 
copies thereof to Stephen G. Morgan, Attorney for Defendants, 
345 South State Street, Suite #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this 26th day of February, 1979. 
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